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I. INTRODUCTION
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.1

According to the noted child psychologist Bruno Bettelheim, the fairy
tales we read as children greatly affect the adults we later become.2 If
Bettelheim is correct in his surmise, then it strikes me that the children
who grow up to be legal academics must be inordinately taken with
Andersen’s tale, The Emperor’s New Clothes,3 because so many of their
later legal writings take the form of assertions that the emperor (namely,
the Supreme Court) has no clothes (namely, no coherent, consistent,
nonfatally flawed doctrine). I have not myself escaped the influence of
this tale, but as a lifelong contrarian, it has affected me in the opposite
way. So instead of doggedly deconstructing legal texts, I seek out their
continuities and harmonies, which are hidden in plain sight.
Here I apply my approach to an area of law that received opinion
would find quite unpromising—the proper scope of the federal
commerce power under our Constitution (hence, the subtitle of this
Article). Most critics find this part of constitutional law a better target
for scorn than praise. One prominent commentator, Donald Regan,
expresses a common complaint when he says that “we still do not have
an adequate theory of the commerce power.” He then goes on to find
current doctrine to be “a mess.”4 Even sitting members of the Court find
great fault with its position here.5 And what they find fault with in the
current state of affairs, they also criticize in doctrinal history. Both left
and right unite in recounting with irritation a roller coaster history of
Commerce Clause precedent6 that begins with John Marshall’s broad,
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
2. He says, for example, “Fairy tales, unlike any other form of literature, direct
the child to discover his identity and calling, and they also suggest what experiences are
needed to develop his character further.” BRUNO BETTELHEIM, THE USES OF
ENCHANTMENT: THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF FAIRY TALES 24 (1976).
3. HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, The Emperor’s New Clothes, in THE COMPLETE
FAIRY TALES AND STORIES 77 (Erik Christian Haugaard trans., 1974).
4. Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 554 (1995).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 640–47 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The
Scope of Congress’s Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849,
873–83 (2002) (representing the conservative, profederalism approach); Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7–12 (2001) (presenting, more briefly,
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classic opinions in McCulloch and Gibbons v. Ogden,7 careens from one
side with the narrow holdings of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries8 to the other with the deferential, anything goes holdings of the
1937–1995 period,9 before once again veering back to more restrictive
holdings in United States v. Lopez10 and United States v. Morrison.11
This seems a poor place to search for continuity and doctrinal consistency.
Despite all this, I will argue that, in fact, there is and has been a
consistent, traditional doctrine of the scope of the federal commerce
power, a doctrine that was shared by the Framers and forcefully stated
by John Marshall in his seminal Commerce Clause opinions,12 one that
runs a middle course between later decisions of opposite extremes. This
doctrine also harmonizes the Lopez and Morrison opinions both with
earlier New Deal era decisions and with the Marshall Court opinions. I
would go so far as to claim that this doctrine expresses the plain
meaning of the Constitution, but for the sad fact that this meaning is
plain to almost no one else today (hence, the title of this Article, one
nicked from Paul Slansky).13
This cure for the Court’s current commerce power difficulties
demands neither the wholesale rejection of present doctrine or precedent
nor the creation of new law or doctrine from whole cloth. No, it requires
little more than the recollection and restoration of the traditional
constitutional notion of incidental powers,14 which has been temporarily
that history from an advocate of federal power). These writers and others, of course,
then proceed to put quite different spins on this history.
7. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
8. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918) (holding,
notoriously, that the regulation of “the hours of labor of children in factories and mines”
was not within the federal commerce power for Congress to enact and was “a purely
state authority”).
9. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (holding, again
notoriously, that even the wheat a farmer grows to feed his own livestock may be
regulated under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, enacted pursuant to the federal
commerce power).
10. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
exceeded the federal commerce power).
11. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (holding that the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 was likewise beyond Congress’s commerce power ).
12. This was perhaps most succinctly stated in the headnote to this Article. Supra
text accompanying note 1.
13. See PAUL SLANSKY, THE CLOTHES HAVE NO EMPEROR: A CHRONICLE OF THE
AMERICAN ’80S (1989).
14. For a textbook exposition of the Marshallian doctrine of incidental or implied
powers as aids in carrying out Congress’s enumerated powers, see JOSEPH STORY, 3
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obscured by the result-driven modern commerce power debate on the
Court and in the academy. In presenting this doctrine, I will start from
the three basic prongs of the Court’s current Commerce Clause test,
which the majorities and dissenters in Lopez and Morrison have distilled
from earlier cases and over which they have essentially agreed to disagree.
These three elements are Congress’s power to regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, and activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.15
The Lopez and Morrison Courts’ adherence to this three-part commerce
standard at first seems to be counterproductive, little more than a half
measure, at once too weak and too strong for its stated purposes. It is
too weak because, standing alone, it offers no basis for voiding the two
acts in question in those cases. Quite the contrary, the Lopez and
Morrison dissenters make much of the ability of the questioned statutes’
ability to meet the third part of the test—the substantial effects prong.16
In fact, in order to strike down the statutes, the Court must introduce an
additional requirement that the regulated activity be economic in
nature.17 But the Court does not cogently explain the provenance and
justification for this new criterion. Worse yet, this move also makes the
Court’s test too strong, for it throws into question some concededly
constitutional federal laws that do not regulate economic activity.18
These shortcomings of the three-part Commerce Clause test, in turn,
place the Court in an uncomfortable trilemma. It cannot clearly explain,
let alone justify, its current stance, but neither does it have a palatable
alternative. The way back to pre-1937 notions of “dual federalism”
would involve the rejection of far more doctrine and precedent than the
Court would dare to overthrow.19 The way forward to accepting the
position of the Lopez and Morrison dissenters is likewise dismissed
because it “would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States.”20 By all appearances, the Court has no good place left to stand.
The way out of the Court’s prison of its own devise lies in the
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 109–26 (Fred B. Rothman
& Co. 1991) (1833).
15. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608–09; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
16. Justice Breyer, for example, goes to “Brandeis brief” lengths to make such a
showing in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560–61.
18. Embarrassingly, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 itself contains just
such a provision, the constitutionality of which the Court does not question. See
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n.5; see also 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
19. Only Justice Thomas is willing to dismantle the test by replacing the
“substantial effects” prong. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
20. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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traditional doctrine of incidental powers, especially in that doctrine’s
textual declaration in the Necessary and Proper Clause.21 We must
recognize that the three parts of the Court’s commerce test are not
created equal. Only the first two actually deal directly with interstate
commerce, the third only deals with activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce; but that is not itself interstate commerce. How,
then, does this “substantially affects” prong also fall within Congress’s
commerce power at all (a question that has not occurred to Court or
commentators, in the main)? This can only happen by way of the doctrine
of incidental powers, which finds its textual exposition in the Necessary
and Proper Clause, and which endows Congress with the choice of
appropriate means by which to pursue constitutionally enumerated ends.
But unlike Congress’s power over the channels and instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, this incidental power is not plenary. Instead, by its
very text and nature, it has a means-ends limitation, lest it convert the
limited commerce power into a general police power. It is, in a word, telic.22
To sum this assertion up in a sentence, the commerce power extends to
activity that is commercial in at least its nature or purpose.23 And the activities
regulated in both Lopez and Morrison are neither. They are, therefore,
beyond Congress’s commerce power. Is there any basis in precedent for
my assertion? You need look no further than the headnote of this Article
from Marshall’s opinion for a unanimous Court in McCulloch.24
This is not, no one will be surprised to read, the only way to parse the
Necessary and Proper Clause, but it is the best. Neither am I the only
one to have taken it in this way. Absolutely no originality is claimed for
this idea. On the contrary, I am standing on far more august shoulders

21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
22. This useful term was introduced to commerce power discussion by David
Engdahl. See DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL § 3.01,
at 20 (2d ed. 1987).
23. Chief Justice Rehnquist begins his opinion for the Court in Lopez by saying
something close to this, but then strays from it later in the opinion. He says, “The Act
neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be
connected in any way to interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
24. Especially note the words, “which are plainly adapted to that end.” McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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here, notably those of Hamilton,25 Madison,26 Marshall,27 Story,28 and
Justice Stone.29
If the doctrine I present has this distinguished a lineage, why is it
remarkable by its absence in the current commerce power discussion?
Primarily because it does not serve the purposes of the hot, result-driven
rhetoric of that debate in which the tail of the desired holding so often
wags the dog of doctrine. But a result-driven approach cannot succeed
because it preaches only to the choir and lacks the resources to appeal to
the nonbeliever and establish the basis for a broader consensus. Most
judges and commentators on both sides of the current argument see the
commerce power issue through the prism of federalism,30 which is the
area of greatest difference between the contending parties. Unfortunately,
they see it more as a club with which to beat the other side than as a clue
in the puzzle of constitutional interpretation.
This is not to deny that federalism is an area of significant importance.
It is only to say that, as it is with happiness, agreement here is best
reached indirectly, as the supervening by-product of other factors
including, most importantly, those shared by both sides (for they will
form the basis for whatever persuasion and agreement that will occur).
II. THE COURT’S CURRENT QUANDARY
A. The Lopez-Morrison Trilemma
The Court’s commerce power mess, and the way out of it, can be
neither understood nor explained apart from a description of how and
why the Court has gotten itself in this position. As with other
uncomfortable positions, this has been the result of trying to do several
different, seemingly inconsistent things at the same time. These goals
may all be laudable, but they jockey uncomfortably for position in the
Lopez and Morrison opinions. Those opinions give evidence of some
25. See, e.g., ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to
Establish a Bank, in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63, 101–07 (Harold C.
Syrett ed., 1965) (setting out first the doctrine of incidental congressional powers later
adopted and defended by Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story).
26. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Speeches in the First Congress—Third Session,
1791. February 2—Bank of the United States, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
19, 27–34 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) (defending the notion of implied powers).
27. Especially in McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
28. See, e,g., STORY, supra note 14, at 109–15.
29. Writing for a unanimous Court in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
30. In this they only follow the lead of the Court itself, which seeks to preserve an
area of state police power beyond the reach of Congress’s commerce power. See, for
example, Justice Thomas’s Lopez concurrence. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
584–85 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).

410

VALAURI.DOC

[VOL. 41: 405, 2004]

9/18/2019 1:48 PM

The Clothes Have No Emperor
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

four main aims the Court seeks to achieve in the commerce power area:
(1) to remain true to received, established commerce power
doctrine,31
(2) to maintain a constitutional commitment to the related
principles of enumerated powers and limited government,32
(3) to achieve and maintain a balance between state and federal
power,33 and
(4) to avoid repudiating its post-New Deal (namely, 1937–1995)
commerce decisions.34
Any plan this complicated and conflicted surely must have a high
degree of difficulty. And good intentions alone will not suffice when at
least two simpler and easier alternative paths lie open to the Court. One
is to drop the first and fourth of the above aims, embrace the second and
third aims, and roll back the revolution of 193735 in order to return to the
more restrictive view of the commerce power that prevailed in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Of the Justices in the Lopez
and Morrison majorities, only Justice Thomas displays any inclination to
thus turn back the clock36 (despite protestations from the dissenters that
this is precisely what the Court is, in fact, doing).37 The rest lack both
the stomachs and the minds for such a move.
31. The Lopez and Morrison Courts find the kernel of that doctrine in the notion
that congressional power reaches the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce and activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. See United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
32. Early in the Lopez opinion, the Court says, “We start with first principles. The
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at
552.
33. A “healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government
will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” Id. (quoting Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
34. Even Justice Thomas would stop short of “totally rejecting our more recent
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.” Id. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring).
35. Justice Souter accuses the Morrison majority of doing something approaching
that, saying, “Cases standing for the sufficiency of substantial effects are not overruled;
cases overruled since 1937 are not quite revived.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 654 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
36. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he very notion of
a ‘substantial effects’ test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original
understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early Commerce Clause
cases.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring).
37. Justice Souter analogizes the Court’s efforts in Lopez to the long-rejected
doctrines of economic substantive due process. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 605–09.
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The second, opposite path is to instead drop the second and the third
of the above aims, and many traditional notions of constitutional law
along with them,38 and follow the dissenters toward a broader, more
politically demarcated commerce power, one that verges upon, if it does
not achieve, a general federal police power.39 In doing this, the Court
might avoid the futility it experienced in its attempt to impose
federalism-based limits on the creeping federal regulation pursuant to
the commerce power of the activities of the states themselves.40
The Court has declined to follow either of these two easier paths for
commendable reasons. The aims it seeks to pursue are all proper aims,
although the justifications it gives for what it does are unconvincing
even to those who agree with the results41 (let alone to those who do
not).42 My first task in this Article will be to explain what the Court has
done in Lopez and Morrison; the second will be to offer suggestions as
to how the result can be maintained while the justification is improved.
For if that cannot be done, the Court will have placed itself in an
uncomfortable trilemma where it will not go back (to pre-1937 doctrine),
cannot go forward (and join the dissenters), and cannot satisfactorily
justify the stand it has taken.
B. Not Back to the Future
When Lopez was decided in 1995, the reaction in both lay and legal
circles was strong and largely negative. One prominent journalist, Linda
Greenhouse, wrote, “[I]t is only a slight exaggeration to say that . . . the

38. In his Lopez concurrence, Justice Kennedy lists “separation of powers, checks
and balances, judicial review, and federalism.” Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
39. This is a repeated concern of the Lopez and Morrison Courts. See Morrison,
529 U.S. at 608 n.3 (assailing Justice Souter’s dissent for the “remarkable theory that the
commerce power is without judicially enforceable boundaries”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567
(accepting that the government’s arguments would “convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States”).
40. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), the Court
voided an extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which had been broadened in
coverage several times since its enactment in 1938, to cover most state and local
employees. Although the Court had earlier, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–
26 (1941), upheld the original 1938 Act as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power,
the Usery Court felt that this extension impermissibly intruded upon traditional state
functions and violated federalism norms recognized in the Tenth Amendment. Usery, 426
U.S. at 841–52. Nine years later, Usery was itself reversed in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 556–57 (1985), as the Court rejected the
concerns of Usery or, at least, returned them to the political arena for resolution.
41. In an article written in reaction to Lopez, Donald Regan writes, “I am inclined to
think the result in Lopez is correct, though it is not my main object to establish that. Even if
the result is right, the opinion of the Court is unsatisfactory.” Regan, supra note 4, at 555.
42. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 646–47 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Court [is] a single vote shy of reinstalling the Articles of Confederation . . . .”43
And legal academic Mark Tushnet asked if we were entering a
constitutional moment (namely, a time of constitutional transformation,
de jure or de facto, such as Reconstruction or the New Deal).44 Many saw
the case as a portent of major constitutional change, for good or for ill.
Given the sharp public reaction, the close 5–4 division on the Court,
and the heated rhetoric of the Lopez and Morrison opinions themselves,
it is surprising to discover upon actually reading the decisions on just
how much the majority and the dissenters do, in fact, agree. They all
adhere, most importantly, to the same basic three-part test of commerce
power constitutionality,45 and they accept the post-New Deal commerce
power cases from which it derives. This flows, in turn, from their
common recognition of our modern integrated national economy and the
functional approach to commerce regulation that goes along with it.
What they differ in is the larger context against which they see this test
and, therefore, the limitations and qualifications they place upon it. But
this disagreement should not be exaggerated into a desire by the majority
to turn the clock back to the doctrines of those formalistic pre-1937
commerce decisions.46
The Lopez and Morrison dissenters themselves do not, in fact, go this
far in their critique of the majority. This is not to say that they raise no
objections. Two important criticisms that the dissenters do make of the
Court’s opinions in these cases are that they are overly formalistic in
their reasoning and that they are inconsistent with the Court’s 1937–1995
run of commerce opinions, none of which struck down congressional
legislation as beyond the scope of the commerce power.
Drawing upon Swift & Co. v. United States,47 Justice Breyer describes
how the cases look, “[a]s long as one views the commerce connection,
not as a ‘technical legal conception,’ but as ‘a practical one.’”48 And
later, he says the majority’s approach in these cases “fails to heed this
43. Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at A1
(discussing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)).
44. See Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional
Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845, 845–46 (1995).
45. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608–09; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–
59 (1995); supra text accompanying note 15.
46. Linda Greenhouse notwithstanding. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
47. 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905) (upholding a federal antitrust statute against a
Commerce Clause challenge).
48. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618–19 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Swift, 196 U.S. at 398).
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Court’s earlier warning not to turn ‘questions of the power of Congress’
upon ‘formula[s]’ that would give ‘controlling force to nomenclature . . .
and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in
question upon interstate commerce.’”49 In a similar vein, Justice Souter
in Morrison speaks, almost wistfully, of the “understanding [of the
commerce power], free of categorical qualifications, that prevailed in the
period after 1937 through Lopez.”50
Both Justices also often assert or imply that the Court’s holdings and
opinions in Lopez and Morrison are not consistent with the 1937–1995
commerce power cases. In Lopez, for example, Justice Breyer
complains that “the majority’s holding runs contrary to modern Supreme
Court cases that have upheld congressional actions despite connections
to interstate or foreign commerce that are less significant than the effect
of school violence.”51 And, in Morrison, Justice Souter asserts that
“[t]he Act would have passed muster at any time between Wickard in
1942 and Lopez in 1995, a period in which the law enjoyed a stable
understanding.”52
It will take the rest of this Article to fully answer these objections, but
we can at least begin here. Of the two charges just discussed, the charge
of formalism against the Lopez and Morrison Courts is the more readily
dispelled. Let us start by looking at what the Court actually says in its
opinions. In his survey of the history of Commerce Clause precedent in
Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist marks the beginning of federal
commerce power doctrine (as opposed to limits on state law due to the
Commerce Clause) with the cases involving the early federal legislation
based upon the commerce power, namely the Interstate Commerce Act53
in 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act54 in 1890.55 He notes that some,
but not all, of those ensuing cases placed formalistic limits on the federal
power56 and that the 1937–1995 cases largely eliminated those distinctions.57
Now, if he were drawn to the formalisms of the 1887–1937 cases, the
Chief Justice surely would have praised those cases and linked true
commerce power doctrine to them. But he does quite the opposite. He
49. Id. at 627–28 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)) (first
alteration in original).
50. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 641 (Souter, J., dissenting).
51. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 625 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting)
53. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000)).
54. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
55. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554.
56. Id. at 554–55.
57. Id. at 555–57.
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speaks approvingly of the New Deal cases that recognize broader federal
commerce power, saying that “the doctrinal change also reflected a view
that earlier Commerce Clause cases artificially had constrained the
authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”58
Recognition of modern economic realities and their constitutional
consequences can also be found in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Lopez. He, too, surveys the history of commerce power precedent.
Looking at the 1887–1937 period, he contrasts those cases that “draw
content-based or subject-matter distinctions, thus defining by semantic
or formalistic categories those activities that were commerce and those
that were not”59 with other decisions from the same era that utilized “a
more sustainable and practical approach.”60
Reviewing this history, Justice Kennedy draws “two lessons of
relevance.”61 The first is “the imprecision of content-based boundaries
used without more to define the limits of the Commerce Clause.”62 And
the other is that “the Court as an institution and the legal system as a
whole have an immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point.”63 These are hardly the
words of formalists and reactionaries eager to upend modern commerce
power doctrine and turn the clock back to the pre-New Deal era or even
more to the Articles of Confederation.
C. A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers
But if the Court in Lopez and Morrison is uninterested in reverting to
the era of formalistic commerce power jurisprudence, so, too, is it
unwilling to move forward to a brave new world of a general federal
police power pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The reason why is
simple and quite basic. Such a move would be contrary to the Framers’
fundamental constitutional design. This is made quite clear at the outset
in Lopez, where, after tracing the procedural history of the case, the
Court says, “We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a
Federal Government of enumerated powers.”64 In this, it does little more
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 556.
Id. at 569 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 571.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 552 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
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than echo Marshall’s basic assumption in McCulloch that “[t]his
government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers,”
to which he adds, “[T]he government of the Union, though limited in its
powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.”65
The reason this point is crucial here is that the Lopez and Morrison
dissents provide no real, legal limitation on the commerce power. And,
as Madison asserted in a 1791 speech in the First Congress debating the
nation’s first major commerce power issue, the establishment of a national
bank, “An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the
Government cannot be just.”66
In Lopez, the Court says, “The Government’s essential contention, in
fine, is that we may determine here that § 922(q) is valid because
possession of a firearm in a local school zone does indeed substantially
affect interstate commerce.”67 It then goes on to worry, “Thus, if we
were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit
any activity . . . that Congress is without power to regulate.”68 The
Court’s misgivings arise, then, not from doubts that the activity in
question falls within the general parameters of the three-part commerce
power test distilled from earlier cases, but rather whether that test ought
to be carried to its logical extremes in its application.
The Court looks at what precedent, including McCulloch, teaches
about enumerated powers69 and answers that question in the negative,
concluding that “[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States. . . . This we are
unwilling to do.”70
In replying to this line of argument, Justice Breyer denies that the
government’s (and the dissent’s) view of the commerce power would erase
the distinction between the local and the national, that it would allow
federal regulation of marriage, divorce, or child custody, or that it would
expand the commerce power.71 But, as the majority notes, he “is unable to
identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not.”72
By the time the Court next wrestles with this problem five years later
in Morrison, the dissenters have a better reply to the majority’s
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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JAMES MADISON, supra note 26, at 27.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 (citation omitted).
Id. at 564.
Id. at 566–67.
Id. at 567–68.
See id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 564.
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enumerated powers argument, one of confession and avoidance. Justice
Souter there says, “In short, to suppose that enumerated powers must
have limits is sensible; to maintain that there exist judicially identifiable
areas of state regulation immune to the plenary congressional commerce
power even though falling within the limits defined by the substantial
effects test is to deny our constitutional history.”73 He then goes on to
object to the Court’s “reviving traditional state spheres of action as a
consideration in commerce analysis.”74
But if turnabout is fair play, he has no good objection to this move.
For he himself is only recycling a move successfully used in Garcia to
snuff out an earlier attempt by a Rehnquist-led Court to limit the use of
the federal commerce power to regulate the states themselves. That
gambit does not deny the existence of limitations on the commerce
power, but insists instead that these limits are political, rather than legal
or constitutional, in nature (and, so, more matters for Congress than for
the courts).75 And it is to these concerns raised by the Garcia gambit
that we now turn.
D. Garcia’s Ghost
Sometimes the Court just muddles through, not having a clear doctrine
in an area of constitutional law, but possessing the negative justification
of avoiding the clear error that lies at both extremes. All other things
being equal, that may be sufficient cause for the Court seeking the mean,
doctrinally speaking. But all things are not equal here. Even though the
Court will not go back to pre-1937 formalism and cannot go forward to
recognize a general federal police, it also has good reason to fear
standing still.
That good reason is Garcia’s ghost. For this is not the Court’s first
retreat from formalism or its first battle over federalism. It is not even
the first “death of federalism.”76 Some of the participants in the current
struggle are veterans, as the dissenters hint, of the Court’s most recent
battle in this area, which occurred between Usery77 in 1976, in which the
Court attempts to set judicially enforceable federalism limits on congressional
exercise of the commerce power on the states themselves, and Garcia
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 646 n.14 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 647.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547–55 (1985).
See infra Part V.A.
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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nine years later, in which the Court terminates these efforts and leaves
Congress to police itself.
These cases make much, positively and negatively, of the notion of
traditional state functions as a line demarcating federalism-protected
state exclusivity. The Usery Court, for example, holds “[t]hat insofar as
the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States’
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted
Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.”78
Garcia, in turn, mocks the very idea of judicially enforceable
traditional state function guidelines and, after attacking their cogency
from both historical and conceptual perspectives, concludes, “We
therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice,
a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial
appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or
‘traditional.’” 79 Then, after summarizing the defects of this approach
(“inconsistent results . . . because it is divorced from those principles [of
democratic self-governance]”), it continues, “If there are to be limits on
the Federal Government’s power to interfere with state functions—as
undoubtedly there are—we must look elsewhere to find them.”80 And
after looking elsewhere, the Court concludes, “State sovereign interests,
then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in
the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations
on federal power.”81
The Garcia Court’s line of argument is echoed by the Morrison
dissenters as an implied threat should they gain one more vote and
become a majority. For as we have already noted,82 Justice Souter does
not reject the traditional notions of enumerated powers and limited
government. He insists only that they lack judicially enforceable formal,
not to say formalistic, standards. So failing this, he finds them subject only
to political, procedural limitations. The ball is thus put back in the court
of the Lopez and Morrison majorities, and the burden is on them to come
up with what they have not adequately done in those opinions—identify
some clear, justified, judicially enforceable restraints on congressional
exercise of the commerce power and thus exorcise Garcia’s ghost. In
the absence of such limits, Justice Souter and the other dissenters feel
entitled to argue that, although political and procedural restraints on the
commerce power may not be perfect, they are nevertheless the best
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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option available for problem at hand (a “second best” solution).
An argument of this type is also offered in the academic discussion of
this issue by Lawrence Lessig, who suggests that American judicial
review is regulated by what he calls “the Frankfurter constraint,” which
asserts “[t]hat a rule is an inferior rule if, in its application, it appears to
be political, in the sense of appearing to allow extra-legal factors to
control its application.”83
Applying this notion in the commerce power context, Lessig believes
that “[t]he question is simply who should draw the limits: Congress or
the Court. . . . The Court would be best if it could construct tools that
would limit Congress’s power without running afoul of the Frankfurter
constraint.”84 Unfortunately, he concludes that, “[i]n [his] view, the tools
that Chief Justice Rehnquist has provided in Lopez will run afoul of the
Frankfurter constraint.”85
So it is a common concern with judicial policy-making that moves
Souter, Lessig, and Frankfurter to rein in judicial review of the
Commerce Clause. This concern may, as well, be seen as nothing more
than an application in the context of the commerce power of standard
justiciability political question limitations, which exclude from the
federal courts a case in which there is “a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion.”86
The objections raised by Souter, Lessig, and Frankfurter score strongly
against the doctrine advanced by the Court in Lopez and Morrison (and,
for that matter, in Usery), but they would fail against clear, discernable,
enforceable, nonpolitical standards for the limitation of the commerce
power. I have been promising just such a doctrine, with an historical
pedigree running back to Hamilton and Marshall, no less, since the
beginning of this Article.87 The stage has been set to introduce the doctrine
83. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 125, 174. As Lessig there notes, Justice Frankfurter discusses this notion in the
context of the Commerce Clause. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE:
UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 54 (1937) (discussing the need for restraints on
“judicial policy-making” in constitutional interpretation by the Court in commerce cases).
84. Lessig, supra note 83, at 196.
85. Id.
86. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 12–13.
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of incidental powers. I will now do so, first in a functional context and
then in an historical and doctrinal context. Let the reader judge it according
to the standards of Garcia’s ghost and the Frankfurter constraint.
Judge it also according to traditional standards of constitutional
evaluation, such as those in Philip Bobbitt’s typology of constitutional
argument—history, text, structure, prudence, and doctrine.88 Bobbitt
defines these traditional forms of constitutional argument in familiar ways.
Historical argument, he says, “marshals the intent of the draftsmen of the
Constitution and the people who adopted the Constitution.”89 In contrast,
textual argument “is drawn from a consideration of the present sense of
the words of the provision.”90 Next, he says, “Structural arguments are
claims that a particular principle or practical result is implicit in the
structures of government and the relationships that are created by the
Constitution among citizens and governments.”91 Prudential argument
looks not to the merits of a case, but “instead advanc[es] particular
doctrines according to the practical wisdom of using the courts in a
particular way.”92 And lastly, doctrinal argument “asserts principles
derived from precedent or from judicial or academic commentary on
precedent.”93 I choose these typologies precisely because they are not
novel or controversial (the reader is free to choose her own, if she wishes).
What purpose do these typologies serve? They act as a sort of
constitutional lingua franca that unites, at least in speech forms, those
constitutional practitioners otherwise divided over case results. They do
this by roughly indicating the conventional standards to be met by any
position claiming constitutional validity. As a result, these typologies provide
both the clubs that critics use to attack opposing positions as well as the
shields that defenders employ to protect favored doctrines and results.
Yes, problems can and do arise when different typologies point toward
different case results,94 but fortunately, this difficulty does not arise with
the doctrine of incidental powers propounded and defended here because
it is the favored doctrine under all five typologies.

88. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7
(1982) (setting out his five types of constitutional argument).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Bobbitt has written a book addressing this problem, too. See generally PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
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III. THE CLOTHES
A. One Size Does Not Fit All
Perhaps the simplest and most direct way of introducing the doctrine
of incidental powers here is by asking the functional question of what
case results a solution to the Lopez-Morrison trilemma would generate
and then showing how incidental powers fits the bill. As noted previously,95
such a solution must satisfy four important aims—consistency with
established commerce power doctrine, fidelity to the principles of
enumerated powers and limited government, maintenance of federalism,
and adherence to post-New Deal commerce power precedent. In terms
of commerce precedent, these aims require affirmation of the
foundational Marshall Court decisions, such as McCulloch and Gibbons,
as well as post-1937 cases including Lopez and Morrison, but they do
not mandate defense of formalist decisions of the 1887–1937 period. In
fact, these aims impliedly reject those decisions as well as the views
contained in the Lopez and Morrison dissents.
Trying to generate these results using the three-part commerce power
test nominally accepted by everyone on the Court, however, is
precisely what got the Court into this trilemma in the first place. For
there is one persistent problem encountered by doctrinal tinkerers on
(and off) the Court: tweaking the test in one place just causes
difficulties in another place.
Let me illustrate this unfortunate fact using what Justice Souter in
Morrison calls “two conceptions of the commerce power, plenary and
categorically limited, [which] are in fact old rivals.”96 Souter, along
with the other Lopez-Morrison dissenters, defends the plenary approach
to the three-part commerce power test,97 one that he identifies with postNew Deal cases like United States v. Darby.98 He contrasts this
conception with the purpose-based version of the test employed by the
Court from which he dissents. To leave no doubt in the mind of the
reader as to which he favors, Justice Souter charges the Court’s approach

95. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
96. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 640 (2000).
97. In other words, one placing no formal limits on the scope of any of the three
parts of the test.
98. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941) (upholding the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938)).
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with guilt by association with Hammer v. Dagenhart,99 saying, “[T]he
enquiry into commercial purpose, first intimated by the Lopez concurrence,
is cousin to the intent-based analysis employed in Hammer, but rejected
for Commerce Clause purposes in Heart of Atlanta and Darby.”100
In a few short words, Justice Souter appears to have inflicted several
grievous wounds on the doctrine of the Lopez-Morrison Courts. For not
only has he placed those cases in a league with one of the least appealing
of the old formalistic commerce decisions, he has joined himself with
important post-New Deal precedent both sides wish to vindicate. And
worse yet for the majority, he has done this on the basis of the old
distinction between plenary and categorically limited conceptions of the
commerce power.
In picking Hammer as the one old, formalistic holding with which to
brand the Lopez-Morrison Courts, Souter has chosen shrewdly. For,
among those cases, Hammer is the most notorious, the one with the best
claim to the unsought title of “the Lochner101 of commerce power
cases.” Lochner, of course, has been called “one of the most condemned
cases in United States history . . . used to symbolize judicial dereliction
and abuse.”102 For this reason, it has been relegated to the lowest level
of critical constitutional esteem, along with cases like Dred Scott v.
Sandford103 and Plessy v. Ferguson.104
Lest you think such a comparison hyperbolic, consider some striking
similarities between Lochner and Hammer:
(1) Both cases void labor statutes enacted to protect exploited
workers (adult bakers in Lochner and children in Hammer)
from the superior power of employers.
(2) Both are classic examples of formalism in the service of
conservative judicial activism.

99. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding a federal child labor act to be beyond Congress’s
commerce power).
100. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 643 (citations omitted).
101. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding New York’s statutory
limit on maximum hours worked by bakers unconstitutional on substantive due process
grounds).
102. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 (1980).
103. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 454 (1857) (denying citizenship rights to AfricanAmericans on substantive due process grounds). For the pairing of Lochner and Dred
Scott, see PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 2 (1990).
104. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding state-ordered racial segregation in
railway travel against an equal protection challenge). The pairing of Lochner and Plessy
occurs in the joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862–63 (1992).
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(3) Both cases feature strong dissents from Justice Holmes in favor
of the right of legislative majorities to enact their will, free of
undue judicial scrutiny.105
(4) Both holdings were overruled in the wake of the Court’s
“revolution of 1937.”106
Justice Souter’s example seems well chosen to drive home his argument
and skewer the reasoning of the Lopez-Morrison Courts.
But Justice Souter’s argument is not as ironclad as it first appears.
Neither is his choice of illustrative cases as helpful to his side as he
thinks. There is, unseen by both sides here, a functional doctrinal
alternative that avoids both his criticisms of the Lopez-Morrison
approach and the reply objection that the plenary approach to the threepart commerce power test “would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the
sort retained by the States.”107
The functional shortcomings of the approaches of both sides in the
commerce power debate arise from a trait they share—they both take a
categorical approach to the three-part test, albeit in different ways (for
the plenary conception of the test is a categorical view, too). Neither
notices that the doctrinal difficulties encountered in applying the test do
not arise with all the possible permutations of limits and parts. No, they
have occurred only with purpose-based or other limitations of the
channels or instrumentalities prongs of the test (as in Hammer) and with
a plenary approach to the substantial effects prong (as with the LopezMorrison dissenters).
In contrast, desired case results occur with a plenary view of the
channels and instrumentalities parts of the test (as in Darby and Heart of
Atlanta) and with a purpose limitation on the substantial effects prong of
the test (as in Lopez and Morrison). Functional considerations, then,
suggest a version of the three-part commerce power test in which the
channels and instrumentalities prongs are plenary in scope, but the
substantial effects prong is purpose-limited.

105. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74.
106. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941) (overruling Hammer);
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937) (overruling Lochner).
107. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
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B. Incidental Powers (A Telic Relation)
A functional analysis of commerce power case results cannot be the
last word, though. For whatever functional advantages the noncategorical
approach to the commerce power test offers might be outweighed when
other factors are considered, sending my argument from the frying pan
to the fire by trading the conflicts of the Lopez-Morrison trilemma for a
theory that apparently violates the basic legal and constitutional
demands of neutral principles and integrity that underlie Garcia’s ghost
and the Frankfurter constraint. An approach that applies different
interpretive limits to different parts of the same constitutional test looks
to be the very antithesis of generality, neutrality, and consistency.
At least since Herbert Wechsler’s famous contribution to the
constitutional controversy raised by the Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,108 the Court’s critics have judged its decisions and
doctrine according to the “special duty of the courts to judge by neutral
principles.”109 Wechsler explains this duty, saying, “[T]he main constituent
of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled,
resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment
on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is
achieved.”110 To this, Robert Bork would add additional requirements.
He states, “We have been talking about neutrality in the application of
principles. If judges are to avoid imposing their own values upon the
rest of us, however, they must be neutral as well in the definition and the
derivation of principles.”111
More recently, Ronald Dworkin has argued against this type of ad hoc
approach to legislations and constitutions, asserting that “we say that a
state that adopts these internal compromises is acting in an unprincipled
way.”112 He calls these provisions “checkerboard laws”113 and contends
that they violate legal integrity in the way some discriminatory statutes
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.114
These strictures raise questions concerning the functionally crafted
version of the three-part commerce power test that I have just
introduced, for it is prima facie nonneutral and admittedly compromises
108. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding public school racial segregation violative of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
109. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 16 (1959).
110. Id. at 15.
111. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 7 (1971).
112. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 183 (1986).
113. Id. at 179.
114. Id. at 184–85.
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conflicting considerations (plenary power and purpose limitation) for
purely practical reasons. If I am to do more than offer the Emersonian
defense that “[a] foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,”115
and in order to show that it is nevertheless an improvement on the
doctrine offered by the Court in Lopez and Morrison, I need a substantial
nonfunctional justification (such as might satisfy Bobbitt’s five
typologies of constitutional argument,116 for example). Fortunately, just
such justification is provided by the constitutional doctrine of incidental
powers, the Necessary and Proper Clause,117 and traditional precedent
and doctrine interpreting them.
The doctrine of incidental powers is the complement to the doctrine of
enumerated powers embodied in the Federal Constitution.118 For if the
federal government is strictly limited to those express powers (as it was,
in theory, under the Articles of Confederation),119 as the nation found out
under the Articles, the national government will be without effective
power. The doctrine of incidental powers remedies this defect by also
giving the general government the related auxiliary powers needed to
carry out its enumerated powers.
At one time, the doctrine of incidental powers was hornbook law, and
I will explain it from one of the great hornbooks of American
constitutional law.120 But over the years it has been largely forgotten,
and now it is unknown even to those who have great need for it. One
might not expect adherents of the plenary power view of the commerce
power to bring up a doctrine that treats at least some federal power here
as less than complete, but it is ignored as well by the Lopez-Morrison
Courts, who could use it to better justify their holdings and doctrine and
by some conservatives writing in the area.121
In his constitutional commentaries, Justice Story introduces the
115. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 25, 33 (1979).
116. See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
118. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“We start with first
principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”).
119. “Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to
the United States, in Congress assembled.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II.
120. See STORY, supra note 14, at 109–26.
121. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 120–37 (2002) (attacking the Court’s LopezMorrison decisions specifically and its federalism doctrine generally).
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doctrine of incidental powers in order to illuminate the meaning of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.122 He says that the clause “is only declaratory
of a truth, which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable
implication from the very act of establishing the national government,
and investing it with certain powers.”123 He asks rhetorically of the
enumerated powers, “What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing
a thing? What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing
the means necessary to its execution?”124 The clause is declaratory
because the power is one inherent in the nature of government.125
Just as the definition of commerce is often central to cases involving
the channels and instrumentalities prongs of the three-part commerce
power test, the definition and degree of necessity is often the central
issue in incidental powers and Necessary and Proper Clause cases.
Following Hamilton and Marshall again, Story rejects the view “that the
constitution allows only the means, which are necessary; not those,
which are merely convenient for effecting the enumerated powers.”126
Instead, he believes, “‘necessary’ often means no more than needful,
requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to.”127 The upshot of this doctrine,
according to Story, is that “congress shall have all the incidental and
instrumental powers, necessary and proper to carry into execution all the
express powers.”128
The application of the doctrine of incidental powers to the three-part
commerce power test thus provides a principled explanation for different
treatment of the substantial effects prong from the channels and
instrumentalities prongs. The channels and instrumentalities parts of the
three-part commerce power test concern interstate commerce itself and,
so, fall within the plenary, enumerated Commerce Clause. Substantial
effects, in contrast, by definition are not interstate commerce themselves,
but rather activities that only affect interstate commerce (they even need
not be commercial in character). They can fall within the commerce
power by virtue of the doctrine of incidental powers if their regulation is
122. Congress’s power is “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
123. STORY, supra note 14, at 109.
124. Id.
125. “In truth, the constitutional operation of the government would be precisely the
same, if the clause were obliterated, as if it were repeated in every article.” Id. at 110.
As we shall see below, in these arguments Story’s points paraphrase, where they do not
actually quote, arguments made by Hamilton and Madison in The Federalist as well as
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch.
126. Id. at 114.
127. Id. at 118.
128. Id. at 113.
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needful (i.e., convenient) to the enforcement of the Commerce Clause
proper. The different, purpose-limited scope of the substantial effects
prong, then, is not merely permissible, but is, in fact, required by the
telic nature of its enabling power.
Application of the doctrine of incidental powers to the cases discussed
above by Justice Souter serves not merely to illustrate the doctrine in a
contemporary context; it also acts to undermine his attack on the LopezMorrison cases. In fact, it provides those case results with a sounder
justification than they originally received from the Court. Recall that
Souter seeks to identify United States v. Darby with the plenary
approach to the commerce power he propounds and also to link the
purpose-limited reasoning in the disfavored Hammer decision with the
Lopez-Morrison cases from which he dissents.129
But as David Engdahl has noted, Darby is not a plenary commerce
power case. It is, instead, a twentieth century paradigm of the classic
doctrine of incidental powers just described.130 Yes, Darby does
overrule Hammer and vindicate federal power to regulate labor
standards pursuant to the federal commerce power. But the case is not a
simple replacement of the purpose-limited view with the plenary version
of that power. As Engdahl points out, there are two quite different parts
of the opinion because there are two different issues raised in the case.131
Justice Stone, writing for an unanimous Court, sets out the issues in this
way:
first, whether Congress has constitutional power to prohibit the shipment in
interstate commerce of lumber manufactured by employees whose wages are
less than a prescribed minimum or whose weekly hours of labor at that wage are
greater than a prescribed maximum, and, second, whether it has the power to
prohibit the employment of workmen in the production of goods “for interstate
commerce” at other than prescribed wages and hours.132

On the first question, the Court invokes the plenary congressional power
over interstate commerce,133 denying a purpose-limitation, saying, “The
129. See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text.
130. See David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper Clause as an Intrinsic
Restraint on Federal Lawmaking Power, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 110–11
(1998) (applying Marshall’s doctrine of implied powers to Darby).
131. See id. at 110 (noting that in addition to upholding the part of the Fair Labor
Standards Act dealing with shipping prohibitions on plenary interstate commerce power
grounds, “[t]he Court also upheld, on quite different grounds and in a separate part of the
opinion, the wage and hour terms of the Act”).
132. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 108 (1941).
133. “The power of Congress over interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself, may

427

VALAURI.DOC

9/18/2019 1:48 PM

motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters
for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution
places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control.”134
But this is only the first question, that involving regulation of
interstate commerce itself (a subject matter within Congress’s
enumerated powers). When it comes to the second question, the one
dealing with activity that is not in interstate commerce, but which only
affects interstate commerce, the Court takes a different approach. Here
“the question [is] whether the employment . . . is so related to the
commerce and so affects it as to be within the reach of the power of
Congress to regulate it.”135 Citing our McCulloch headnote as authority,
the Court states the following:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce . . . extends to those activities
intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of
Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce.136

Thus, pace Justice Souter, Darby stands not for the rejection of the
purpose-limited approach to the federal commerce power and the victory
of its plenary competitor. No, instead it stands for the more nuanced
approach of the traditional doctrine of incidental powers, which, applied
to the three-part commerce power test here, gives a plenary reading of
the channels and instrumentalities prongs of the test while purposelimiting only the substantial effects part. Hammer is criticized and
overruled, not because it uses a purpose limitation, but because it
incorrectly employs it in the wrong context (Hammer is taken up
pursuant to the first question in Darby).137
The reversal of his Darby analysis also undercuts Justice Souter’s
critique of, and worse yet from his perspective, offers a better rationale
for, the Lopez-Morrison holdings,138 one that justifies a purpose-limited
overruling of the substantial effects-based statutes in question in Lopez
and Morrison, while leaving the earlier post-New Deal commerce power
decisions untouched. To examine the relation (namely, the degree of
necessity) called for by the doctrine of incidental powers, we next turn to
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are
prescribed in the Constitution.’” Id. at 114 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
196 (1824)).
134. Id. at 115.
135. Id. at 117.
136. Id. at 118–19 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
137. See id. at 115–17.
138. For neither of these utilizes an incidental powers argument to reach its holding,
although they should. See Engdahl, supra note 130, at 115–17 (critiquing Lopez along
these lines).
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a discussion of some relevant history and precedent pertaining to the
Necessary and Proper Clause.139
IV. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
A. Hamilton and the Bank
If the doctrine of incidental powers has a father, he is Alexander
Hamilton, who gives an incidental powers defense of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in The Federalist140 and also presents the doctrine fullblown in his Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a
Bank141 to President Washington. In the constitutional ratification period
in the late 1780s, the Necessary and Proper Clause, because of its
seemingly vague terms and broad sweep, was a lightning rod for
Antifederalist criticism. Consider some representative attacks from the
pseudonymous debate of the fall of 1787. An Old Whig complains of
the “undefined, unbounded and immense power which is comprised in
the . . . clause.”142 Centinel worries that, combined with the Supremacy
Clause, it would be used to “controul and abrogate any and every of the
laws of the state governments, on the allegation that they interfere with
the execution of any of their powers.”143 And Brutus is concerned that
Congress might use the power deriving from this clause “as entirely to
annihilate all the state governments, and reduce the country to one single
government.”144
It is in part to allay these fears and refute this parade of horribles that
Hamilton and other Federalists take up pen. Recognizing that the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause “have been the
sources of much virulent invective and petulant declamation against the

139. This will not be a general history or analytic discussion of the meaning of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Others have already done that. See, e.g., Randy E.
Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 786–93 (1997) (examining the
role of the Necessary and Proper Clause in limiting Congress to carrying out its
enumerated powers); J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581 (analyzing the Court’s recent federalism
decisions from the perspective of the Necessary and Proper Clause).
140. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
141. HAMILTON, supra note 25.
142. An Old Whig, No. 2, in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 239, 239 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
143. Centinel, No. 5, in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 142, at 239, 239.
144. Brutus, No. 1, in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 142, at 240, 240.
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proposed constitution,”145 Hamilton seeks to reassure ratifiers by
refuting these dramatic charges. He counters that these two clauses “are
only declaratory of a truth, which would have resulted by necessary and
unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a Federal
Government, and vesting it with certain specified powers.”146 He then
asks rhetorically, “What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a
thing? What is the ability to do a thing but the power of employing the
means necessary to its execution?”147 He would feign wonder that the
Antifederalists are discomfited in the first place.
Although he would modify his view later, Madison at the time joins
Hamilton in defense of the Necessary and Proper Clause, asserting that
“[w]ithout the substance of this power, the whole Constitution would be
a dead letter.”148 He proceeds next to defend the form of the power by
showing its superiority to other methods—the express power wording of
the Articles of Confederation, positive enumeration of all powers, negative
enumeration of prohibited powers, and silence on the subject.149 These
assurances by Hamilton and Madison may have been sufficient for
ratification purposes, but they do not clearly specify the sweep of the clause.
This problem and its solution come into clearer focus during the
debate over the establishment of a national bank in 1791. In this debate,
Madison joins Jefferson in what a few years earlier would have been
called an Antifederalist view of the issue. As was his wont, President
Washington solicits the opinions of his cabinet on the matter and
Hamilton responds with his Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to
Establish a Bank.150
Hamilton must here respond to Jefferson’s argument that “[t]he
second general phrase is ‘to make all laws necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the enumerated powers.’ But they can all be carried
into execution without a bank. A bank therefore is not necessary, and
consequently not authorized by this phrase.”151 He must also find an
answer to Jefferson’s assertion that “the constitution allows only the
means which are ‘necessary’ not those which are merely ‘convenient’
for effecting the enumerated powers.”152 In the same month, Madison,
then in Congress, argues against the bill, saying, “The essential
145. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis in original).
148. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 303 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphasis in original).
149. Id. at 303–05.
150. HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 63–134.
151. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing
a National Bank, in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 142, at 245, 246.
152. Id.
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characteristic of the Government, as composed of limited and enumerated
powers, would be destroyed, if, instead of direct and incidental means,
any means could be used, which . . . might be conducive to the successful
conducting of finances.’”153
In his Opinion, Hamilton sets the doctrine of incidental powers and
the nature and scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause so clearly,
authoritatively, and one might even say, canonically that later notable
discussions (for example, by Marshall in McCulloch and Story in his
Commentaries) are but restatements and glosses thereon. He starts with
basic premises by declaring:
[T]his general principle is inherent in the very definition of Government . . .
that every power vested in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and includes
by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite, and fairly
applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power.”154

One upshot of this principle is that “there are implied, as well as express
powers, and that the former are as effectually delegated as the latter.”155
Hamilton counters Jefferson’s definition of “necessary” in the Necessary
and Proper Clause by pointing out that “necessary often means no more
than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to.”156 To define
the word narrowly, as Jefferson does, “would be to give it the same force
as if the word absolutely or indispensibly had been prefixed to it.”157
This does not mean that the power is without limit. “For no government
has a right to do merely what it pleases.”158 If that is so, what are the
limits of this doctrine and clause and how are they determined?
Hamilton answers, “It leaves therefore a criterion of what is
constitutional, and of what is not so. This criterion is the end to which
the measure relates as a mean.”159
B. The McCulloch Model (Three, Not Two)
There will be no general discussion of McCulloch here because, in
truth, it does little new but enter the doctrine of Hamilton’s Opinion into
constitutional case law. Instead, I seek only to make two points, two
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

JAMES MADISON, supra note 26, at 30.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 98.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id. at 107.
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crucial points, about the role of McCulloch in commerce power doctrine
and history. The first is that it is often left out of this doctrine and
history altogether, with distorting effects resulting. The second is that,
when it is considered, it is usually misinterpreted in a crucial way.
All too often, writers on the commerce power, on and off the bench,
begin their histories five years too late, with Gibbons from 1824, rather
than with McCulloch from 1819. The problem with this, beyond mere
obsessiveness, is that Gibbons is, in modern analytical terms, a channels
and instrumentalities case. Because it is a channels and instrumentalities
case, it is concerned with the meaning of commerce in general and
whether navigation is commerce, the Court concluding that “‘commerce,’
as the word is used in the constitution, comprehends navigation.”160
With Gibbons as a starting point, there is a natural tendency to overlook
and forget the doctrine of incidental powers and the traditional meaning
of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
This is what Chief Justice Rehnquist unfortunately does in his
discussion of commerce power doctrine and history in Lopez.161 From
this he is led to a categorical approach to the commerce power. This
leaves him with a Hobson’s choice—either adopt the plenary view of the
dissenters and virtually cede Congress a general police power or else
adopt a purpose-based limitation of the commerce power and risk the
fate of Hammer, the Lochner of commerce power cases. He is lucky that
Lopez and, for that matter, Morrison are substantial effects cases, so that
his mistake affects only the rationales, but not the results, of those cases.
So, when the Chief Justice introduces the economic activity limitation162
to the three-part commerce power test, he fails to restrict its application
to the substantial effects prong only, perhaps because, having overlooked
the notion of incidental powers, he lacks a clear rationale for doing so.
This has at least two bad consequences. One is that, as a result, he
cannot say why Congress does have the power to regulate noneconomic
160. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).
161. He starts his discussion by saying, “The Court, through Chief Justice Marshall,
first defined the nature of Congress’ commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden.” United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995) (citations omitted). This is not quite true.
What Marshall does in the quotation from Gibbons that follows this statement is to
define commerce itself (after all, the issue in Gibbons), not the broader commerce power,
which also includes Congress’s incidental power as auxiliary to its enumerated power
under the Commerce Clause proper.
The Chief Justice is by no means alone in this misstep. Notable commentators also
make the same move. Donald Regan, for example says, “[O]ur Commerce Clause jurisprudence
began with Gibbons v. Ogden, and Gibbons is commonly read as a prescient anticipation
of the essentially unlimited commerce power we now recognize.” Regan, supra note 4,
at 573 (footnote omitted).
162. “Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
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activity involving the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce. He cannot say why because Congress, in fact, does, contrary
to the implication of his limitation, indeed have the power to regulate
noneconomic activity in the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, as the Court in Morrison seems to concede.
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, under scrutiny in that
case, itself contains such a provision. The Court there remarks that
“[s]ection 40221(a) of the Act creates a federal criminal remedy to
punish ‘interstate crimes of abuse including crimes committed against
spouses or intimate partners . . . who cross State lines to continue the
abuse.’”163 It goes on to note with apparent approval that “[t]he Courts
of Appeals have uniformly upheld this criminal sanction as an appropriate
exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, reasoning that ‘[t]he
provision properly falls within the first of Lopez’s categories as it
regulates the use of channels of interstate commerce.’”164
But how can the place of occurrence affect or determine the economic
or noneconomic nature of the underlying act itself, the factor made
pivotal by the Court in Lopez? Plainly, it cannot. But how then can
whether or not the abuse occurs in the channels and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce determine the constitutional power of Congress to
criminalize it? Yet I agree with both views of the Court here: the
constitutionality of section 40221(a) of the Act and the unconstitutionality
of the civil remedy, 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
The Chief Justice does not have a good rationale for these discordant
intuitions because the Gibbons family of cases cannot provide him with
one.165 But McCulloch and its progeny, in contrast, through the doctrine
of incidental powers and the Necessary and Proper clause, can explain
why these differing results are called for.
The initial question before the Court in McCulloch is, “[H]as Congress
power to incorporate a bank?”166 Because there clearly is no such

163. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 n.5 (2000) (quoting S. REP. NO.
103-138, at 43 (1993)).
164. Id. at 614 n.5 (quoting United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571–72 (5th
Cir. 1999)) (alterations in original).
165. This is why no one wins the debate in Lopez between Justices Thomas and
Breyer over the meaning and significance of Gibbons—that case is largely irrelevant to
the central issues in Lopez. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 593 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at
630 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
166. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
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express congressional power,167 the question is, then, whether this power
falls within its implied or incidental powers, for “a government,
entrusted with such ample powers . . . must also be entrusted with ample
means for their execution.”168 Reviving Jefferson’s earlier argument,
Maryland argues that Congress is limited to means “such as are
indispensable, and without which the power would be nugatory.”169 And
echoing Hamilton’s reply to Jefferson, Marshall asserts that the word
“necessary” “frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient,
or useful, or essential to another.”170 Ultimately, Marshall delivers the
statement that is our headnote,171 summarizing the means-ends
requirement of incidental powers.
Now, that may be enough to resolve the issue before the Court, but it is
not enough to clearly resolve the question of how close a means-ends
relation is required. And that brings me to my second McCulloch-related
point. Judges and commentators too often assume a false dichotomy
relating to necessity and McCulloch—if the absolutely necessary
definition proffered by Maryland is to be rejected, then almost anything
goes,172 as might pass a rational basis test. So, for example, in Lopez, after
rehearsing relevant commerce power doctrine, Justice Breyer says,
“Applying these principles to the case at hand, we must ask whether
Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a significant (or
substantial) connection between gun-related school violence and interstate
commerce.”173 So too, in Morrison, after quoting Darby on the Necessary
and Proper Clause,174 Justice Souter says, “Accordingly, for significant
periods of our history, the Court has defined the commerce power as
plenary, unsusceptible to categorical exclusions, and this was the view
expressed throughout the latter part of the 20th century in the substantial
effects test.”175
167. See id. at 406 (“Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of
establishing a bank or creating a corporation.”).
168. Id. at 408.
169. Id. at 413.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 421.
172. And so to mock this view of the Commerce Clause, Judge Kozinski referred to
it as the “Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause.” Alex Kozinski, Introduction
to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (1995).
173. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 618 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 640 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
The power of Congress . . . extends to those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate
end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.
Id. (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941)).
175. Id.
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When I presented an earlier version of this Article to law professors, one
strong reaction of theirs was that Marshall shared this view too, that he never
met an assertion or expansion of federal power he did not like. But that
position is not consistent with Marshall’s words in McCulloch. Textually, the
best indication of this is the pretext language in McCulloch itself:
[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become
the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come
before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.176

Those who believe that Marshall in McCulloch takes a rational basis
view of the Necessary and Proper Clause do not know quite what to
make of this statement because it does not fit in with their theory of the
case and the clause.177 What they should take from it is that the doctrine
of incidental powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause must have
some teeth.
And if one textual bit is not enough for them, the controversy arising
out of the McCulloch decision provides yet more evidence. Not
surprisingly, Marshall’s decision provoked criticism from states’ rights
adherents who opposed a broad reading of federal power. The most
articulate and influential critics resided in his home state of Virginia.
In the spring and summer of 1819, Amphictyon and Hampden (this
was another pseudonymous debate) assailed Marshall and McCulloch
in the Richmond Enquirer.178 The main points of their attack are
straightforward and familiar. On March 30, Amphictyon says, “Although
every one admits that the government of the United States is one of
limited powers . . . , yet so wide is the latitude given to the . . . word
‘necessary’ . . . that it will . . . really become a government of almost
unlimited powers.”179 He goes on to worry that the Antifederalist
prophesy of unlimited federal power under a supposedly limited
Constitution is coming true.180
Marshall replies to Amphictyon in the Philadelphia Union under the
pseudonym, “A Friend of the Union.” In his April 24, 1819 piece,
176. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
177. One commentator tries to minimize the statement by saying that Marshall only
“teasingly” suggests it. See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints
on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (2001).
178. JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 52, 106 (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969).
179. Id. at 64, 65.
180. Id. at 74.
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Marshall opines that there are three possible senses that might be given
to the phrase “necessary and proper”—a restricted sense (namely, the
one favored by Amphictyon and Marshall’s other critics at the time), a
liberal sense (the anything goes view they accused him of), and the fair
sense (the intermediate view he, in fact, took in McCulloch).181 Marshall
spends all his effort arguing for the fair sense, the view of incidental
powers running back to Hamilton.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment Analogy
The doctrine of incidental powers I have been presenting is a general
doctrine of federal power, not one peculiar to the commerce area
(although for historical and practical reasons, that may be its most fertile
area of application). One would expect, then, to see it and the issues we
have seen here recur with respect to other constitutional provisions and
federal powers. And so it does. The debates and disagreements we have
traversed here are largely replayed in the history of the other major fount
of federal legislative power—Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This is no coincidence, but is due to the same causes that produced
disagreement here—differences over theories of constitutional
interpretation, the scope of federal power, and case results.
I will not here present The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That has already been done182—and I disagree with it. A
brief survey of some ways in which Section Five framing history, early
interpretation, and current doctrine support my account of incidental
powers and, in turn, are supported by it will suffice.
From the beginning, Section Five tracks Necessary and Proper Clause
language and doctrine. The original proposed draft from Representative
John Bingham of Ohio provides that “[t]he Congress shall have power to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the
citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states.”183 The adopted text uses the word “appropriate” as the
bearer of the “necessary and proper” notion. The first Supreme Court
case interpreting Section Five says, “Whatever legislation is
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments
have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions
181. Id. at 91, 91–105.
182. See, e.g., Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109
YALE L.J. 115, 134–40 (1999) (arguing that Marshall held a loose, rational relationship
view of the Necessary and Proper Clause and of Congress’s incidental powers in
McCulloch).
183. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
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they contain, . . . if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power.”184 And recent cases, too, pay their respects,
saying for example, “[T]he McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the
measure of what constitutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”185
That is the good news. The bad news is that there are two different
understandings of the meaning of “appropriate” here, both claiming
roots in McCulloch and the Necessary and Proper Clause—one
corresponding to Marshall’s liberal sense of “necessary and proper” and
the second corresponding to his fair sense.186 It should come as no
surprise that adherents of the liberal sense react with anger and surprise
when the Court, in reviewing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
applies scrutiny with some teeth to hold it unconstitutional.187 The Court
requires that “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.”188 It is unfortunate that the Court does not employ this sort of
incidental powers language in Lopez and Morrison as well.
One common major criticism of the Court’s decision in Boerne is that
it improperly narrows the McCulloch standard. Evan Caminker, for
example, says, “Rather than being assessed under the conventional
‘rational relationship’ test established by McCulloch v. Maryland in the
context of Article I powers, now Section 5 regulations . . . must survive
the stricter standard of ‘congruence and proportionality’ between means
and legitimate ends.”189 But the import of all I have argued before is
that, if McCulloch is to be the standard (and I have noted significant
historical support for that assumption), then means-ends congruence and
proportion is precisely what is demanded.
V. A FEDERAL SYSTEM
A. The Third Death of Federalism?
Most other accounts of Lopez and Morrison have seen the cases
through the prism of federalism. I have not, preferring instead the
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879).
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
Id. at 520.
Caminker, supra note 177, at 1131–32 (footnotes omitted).
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perspective of limited and enumerated powers. But the two topics are
not unrelated, and I do have two federalism-related arguments to make
in support of my general position. The first is an argument against
Garcia’s ghost, and the second is an observation about the notion of
constitutional interpretation in a federal system.
When the “revolution of 1937” greatly expanded commerce power
interpretation, Edward Corwin marked The Passing of Dual Federalism.190
And when the Court overruled National League of Cities in the Garcia
case in 1985, William Van Alstyne noted The Second Death of
Federalism.191 Is it crying wolf now to worry that in the 5–4 splits in
Lopez and Morrison, we are but one vote switch from a third death of
federalism? The very number should give me pause, but the threat of
what Justice Souter’s Garcia-based critique of the Lopez-Morrison
position poses spurs me to voice my concern.
The argument by Justice Souter that I have called Garcia’s ghost192 is
presented as a fallback solution to compensate for the perceived faults of
the Court’s commerce power doctrine. My aim in the main heretofore
has been to work to strengthen the justification for that doctrine, but in
this section my aim is negative—to undercut the plausibility of and
support for Garcia’s ghost itself. For that plausibility is illusory.
Garcia’s ghost says that if, as it argues, substantive protections for
federalism are unworkable, then procedural protections can serve
instead. These protections lie in “the structure of the federal system,”193
namely, in protection by Congress.
But protection of state interests by Congress is no protection at all.
The fox running the henhouse nature of this argument can be made
clearer by analogy. The implication of Souter’s argument is that the
states will find protection in Congress because they are represented in
Congress. If we substitute “individual rights” for “state interests” in this
argument, would anyone accept that the assertions that individual rights
cannot be clearly specified or that, even if they can, the rights of
individuals will be adequately protected by Congress simply because
individuals are represented in Congress? Certainly not.194
Another argument against Garcia’s ghost is that it only purports to limit
190. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
191. William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1709 (1985).
192. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
193. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985).
194. Although the Garcia majority was unimpressed with this argument when
Justice Powell made it there in dissent: “One can hardly imagine this Court saying that
because Congress is composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights are amply protected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted today is
indistinguishable in principle.” Id. at 565 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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federal power, but it in fact leaves federal power over the states unlimited.
Let us look at definitions. Around the time that the Framers in Philadelphia
were trying to craft a constitution of limited government, the noted
English legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham was giving advice to the French
concerning their constitution. Among other things, he wanted to convince
them of the necessity of an omnipotent legislature, saying the following:
If there were a proposition in government more self-evident than any other, one
should think it would be that at every period there should be some one authority
competent to do every thing that may require to be done by government, and
that that authority should extend to every case whatsoever.195

Does Bentham’s “self-evident” proposition not describe Congress
under Garcia’s ghost? What are the legal limits on its power? It is the
very definition of sovereignty in that it is “incapable of legal limitation.”196
Under this scheme Congress may do whatever it chooses to do to the
states without violating states’ rights or giving the states any formal
recourse. If this is protection, then protect me from such protection.
B. Federalism and Constitutional Interpretation
The other federalism argument I advance is one that, as far as I can
tell, is original. It is simply this: If all parties agree that our Constitution
establishes a federal system, does that fact have any structural implications
for constitutional interpretation generally and for the commerce power
debate in particular? I think that it has at least one—that the nature of
the federal system argues for Marshall’s “fair sense” of necessary and
proper over the two other alternatives.
How? Ask what level of incidental power is appropriate in each sort
of system—confederation, federal government, and unitary government.
The Articles of Confederation properly limit federal power strictly to
expressly granted powers, the better to preserve the sovereignty of the
individual states. Unitary governments need no distinction between
express and incidental powers because the unitary government has
general legislative power. So, England with parliamentary supremacy
has traditionally lacked a written constitution. But the intermediate
195. Jeremy Bentham, Necessity of an Omnipotent Legislature, in RIGHTS,
REPRESENTATION, AND REFORM: NONSENSE UPON STILTS AND OTHER WRITINGS ON THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 263, 265 (Philip Schofield et al. eds., 2002).
196. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 212 (Wilfrid E.
Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832).
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category, federal government, needs some balance, some rough division
of powers to maintain checks and balances between the state and federal
governments. That balance is provided, in part, by the doctrine of
incidental powers, as declared by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION: JUST AN OLD FEDERALIST
After reading this Article, given its arguments and especially given its
heroes (Hamilton, Marshall, and Story), some wag might remark that I
am just an old Federalist. That wag would be right. But an old
Federalist is not a bad thing to be in this contest. If the Frankfurter
constraint disfavors influence by political, nonlegal factors,197 it is a
definite advantage to be an adherent of a doctrine associated with a longdefunct political party. But there are stronger reasons, too. The
Federalist position satisfies so many of Bobbitt’s typologies of
constitutional argument198 for the obvious reason that Federalists wrote
the Constitution and imbued it with their principles and worldview.
And speaking of worldviews, let me close with an irony. The
Federalist view I expound insists that the Necessary and Proper Clause is
merely declaratory of principles already in the Constitution and, as Story
asserts, “the constitutional operation of the government would be
precisely the same, if the clause were obliterated, as if it were repeated
in every article.”199 Why do the old Federalists argue that the doctrine is
obvious even without explicit statement, when today we cannot even
agree on the meaning of the written clause? Why do the Lopez-Morrison
dissenters seek to implement the Antifederalists’ parade of horribles,
which the Framers explicitly rejected?
Robert Cover answers these questions when he says the following:
We inhabit a nomos—a normative universe. . . . The rules and principles of
justice, the formal institutions of the law . . . are, however, but a small part of
the normative universe that ought to claim our attention. . . . Once understood
in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a
system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.200

We lack understanding because we no longer inhabit the Founders’
constitutional nomos and so, no longer fully comprehend it. In a larger sense,
then, this Article preaches a homecoming. And in regaining and reemploying
the doctrine of incidental powers, we are not “dissing Congress,”201 but
rather becoming reacquainted with our constitutional nomos.
197.
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